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Abstract 
Duration Calculus, a real-time interval logic, has 
been embedded in the Z specification language to pro- 
vide a notation f o r  real-time systems that combines 
the modularisation and abstraction facilities of Z with 
a logic suitable for  reasoning about real-time proper- 
ties [4 ,  21. In this article the notation is presented 
through a top-level specification of requirements for a 
simple Air  Traffic Monitoring system, and reasoning 
is illustrated by a refinement towards a design. 
Keywords: real-time systems, requirements, formal 
specifications, refinement, design. 
1 Introduction 
A purpose of formal specifications is to  contribute 
to concise and understandable documentation of re- 
quirements, assumptions and design. Furthermore 
they shall allow a designer to  reason about correct- 
ness of a design with respect to  requirements under 
given assumptions. Previous work within the Prov- 
ably Correct Systems project [l] has demonstrated use 
of Duration Calculus, a real-time interval logic as a 
notation for concise specification and reasoning about 
real-time systems [9, 3, 51. In that work, the notation 
is used in the usual mathematical fashion with implicit 
declarations and modularisation through textual sub- 
division. This paper illustrates an  application of a new 
development, where the Duration Calculus is embed- 
ded in the widely used Z language [ll] which provides 
a precise explicit notation for modular specifications 
suitable for larger scale developments. 
The timed Z notation is illustrated by means of a 
case study which is based on an air traffic monitoring 
problem posed by the University of Stirling[7]. The 
paper is organized so it documents the development 
stages: 
1. Definition of a system model, and specification of 
*This work is partially funded by the Commission of the Eu- 
ropean Communities (CEC) under the ESPRIT programme in 
the field of Basic Research Project No. 7071: ProCoS: Provably 
Correct Systems”. 
requirements. 
2. Specification of a control design for the system 
and assumptions about the environment. 
3. Verification of the control design by proving that 
the design refines the requirements under the as- 
sumptions. 
Although the documentation is presented in a top- 
down fashion, it must be noted that development of a 
sufficiently abstract system model and a correct design 
is an  iterative process. 
In the conclusion we report experience with a proof 
assistant tool encoded in PVS [8, 101 for mechanical 
verification. In order to give a feeling of how proofs 
in the Duration Calculus are structured the detailed 
verifications are given in an  appendix. 
2 Air Traffic Monitoring System 
The air traffic monitoring system monitors the posi- 
tion of civil aircraft in the vicinity of an airport. Air- 
craft may be landing at, departing from or crossing 
over the airport. The aims of the system are: 
1. to ensure aircraft do not risk mid-air collision by 
2. to organize landing and departings of aircraft, 
3. to collect position information from radar 
coming too close to each other, 
and 
The components of a system model are: an Airspace 
database containing the aircraft, a Radar that  mea- 
sures the positions of aircraft, an  Alert mechanism 
that alerts aircraft in collision risk, and finally one or 
more Runways for the landing and departures of air- 
craft. The task of a software design for the system 
is to take care of the correct interplay between the 
components. 
The tasks of the system motivates a modular com- 
position of the overall system. To keep the presen- 
tation short, we will focus on the collision avoidance 
part of the system, and hence describe the interplay 
between Airspace and Alert components. This sub- 
system will be denoted as CAS, Collision Avoidance 
System. It should be noted that the developed model 
is kept deliberately simple. For instance the velocity 
of aircraft is not modeled, but this can easily be added, 
and is used in the larger model presented in [6]. 
1068-3070/94 $03.00 0 1994 IEEE 
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3 System Model 3.1 Requirements 
We consider a single safety requirement, REQ,  
namely the fact that  no collisions may take place in 
the controlled air space. 
REQ e O(7Col l )  
The modal operator, U, means for any interval of*time. 
The formula says that for any interval of time the pred- 
icate ~ C o l l  holds. 
In this section a system model of the CAS subsys- 
tem is derived in order to capture the safety require- 
ment. First we introduce some design parameters: 
vmaxi R : W 
T I  Tail Tcoii, Tinit : Time 
These parameters will be explained below. 
Air space: 
A state is needed to track all aircraft in the controlled 
air space. This state, which is a real-time database 
recording all aircraft positions, will be named Pos. It 
is declared in a schema. 
AIRSPACE 
Pos : ID + (State POSITION)  
Since the notion of time is implicit in our notation we 
use the keyword State to denote time varying states. 
A variable with this keyword is interpreted as a func- 
tion of time. 
The database is a function from aircraft-identifiers, 
[ID], to information about the aircraft, in this simple 
case a position, which changes over time. The fact that  
no aircraft can be in different places in same time is 
thus captured by the model variable. The positions 
are Cartesian coordinates with the origin being the 
location of the radar. 
POSITION 2 [ x : R; y : W; z : R ] 
Distance between positions is computed by a function 
dzst. We define first a predicate Close, which holds if 
the distance between two aircraft becomes less than 
some input parameter x?: 
Close 
x? : W 
3 id1, id2 : dom Pos e 
rPos(id1) = pi A Pos(id2) p21 A 
id1 # id2 A dist(p1,pz) < x? 
Note that in Z all free variables are universally quan- 
tified. 
Aircraft are surrounded and protected by a sphere, 
with radius, r 2 0, that  no other aircraft is permit- 
ted to  enter. For simplicity we assume all aircraft have 
the same speed, and hence the same protection sphere. 
A violation of this sphere, i.e if the distance between 
two aircraft becomes less than 2r is tantamount to a 
collision. Hence the predicate Coll: 
Coll Close[2r/x?] 
The predicate is defined by renaming of the input pa- 
rameter x? to r .  
4 Control System Design 
In this section a refinement of the system model 
towards a design is presented. The design consists 
of some assumptions that should be satisfied by the 
environment and a controller in terms of a finite state 
automaton. 
4.1 Assumptions 
To detect collision risks a bigger sphere with radius, 
R > r ,  surrounding each aircraft is needed. A collision 
risk appears when the distance between two arbitrary 
aircraft becomes less than 2R. Figure 1 illustrates the 
idea. 
Figure 1: Protection spheres 
We will also assume a general maximum velocity, 
'U, > 0, for all aircraft in the air space. The worst 
collision time, Tcoll occurs when two aircraft, sepa- 
rated by a distance of 2R,  move against each other 
with this maximum velocity. This time is given by 
the equation 
Furthermore we will assume that the positions only 
change after T time units, i.e. a measured position is 
stable for time T .  In order to be able to detect COL- 
sion risks in time we require that the aircraft do not 
move too fast. These two assumptions are expressed 
as: 
A IRSPA CE 
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These formula use the chop operator ' ; I  to divide an  in- 
terval into contiguous subintervals. The first formula 
considers an  interval, where a given aircraft id change 
to position p1 and then away again. For any interval 
of this form the length, e, is greater than T .  The sec- 
ond formula states that  for any interval consisting of 
an initial subinterval where an  aircraft with id has po- 
sition pl followed by a unspecified subinterval, true, 
and followed by a third subinterval in which the same 
aircraft has now position p2 then the flown distance is 
less than U, ( e  + T ) .  
From AS& we are able to set an upper bound 
on the sampling time T .  First we need a predicate, 
Allsafe,  which holds ifall aircraft are safely separated: 
Allsafe A ~ C l o s e [ 2 R / x ? ]  
Fact l :  A potential collision is detectable if all aircraft 
are safe before a collision and if T 5 Tcozz. 
O(Al1Sufe ; true ; Col1 + .t 2 Tiozz - T )  
Fact2: A collision risk may be missed by the system if 
T > T ~ ~ z z -  
O(Al1Safe ; Col1 j T > Tol l )  
Proofs of these facts are given in Appendix B. As 
a consequence of these lemmas we will assume that 
Tcozz 2 T .  
Alert: 
To ensure safety, the system must alert the pilots of 
aircraft being in a collision risk, i.e. whenever two 
aircraft come too close to  each other. The pilots of 
aircraft in collision are then alerted via an air traffic 
controller. We introduce a state variable, Alert,  a set 
of identifiers, for aircraft in collision risk. The states 
of the CAS system are now collected in the schema: 
r 2AEF 
Alert : State P ID 
The interplay between Alert and the pilots is not spec- 
ified in this work, but instead we assume that an intel- 
ligent plan for avoiding the collisions is produced by 
the air traffic controller, and that the pilots follow the 
plan and are out of the danger zone within Tal time 
units. Finally we will assume that in an  initial interval 
of length Tinit all aircraft are safely separated. The 
above assumptions are now formalised in a schema: 
TCOZl 2 T 
[InDanger C_ Alert]  4' [InDanger = { }1 
0 < e 5 Tinit + Allsafe 
T 
The third assumption is expressed by use of the timed 
progress operator: 
D 1 $ D 2 G n ( ( D 1 A l = T ) ;  e > O +  e =  T ;  Dz ; true) 
The formula states that  if a formula D1 holds for time 
T on an  interval then formula D2 holds initially on a 
succeeding non-point interval. 
The function InDanger finds all aircraft being in a 
collision risk. 
InDanger 
AIRSPACE r ds! : State P ID 
ds! = (A t : Time 0 
{ i d  I id : dom Pos A 
3 id1 : dom Pos a ad # id1 A  d i d  ( POS( id ) (  t ) ,  POS(  id i ) (  t ) )  < 2 R ) )  
The output parameter, ds!,  records the aircraft having 
a collision risk as a function of time. 
4.2 Controller Design 
The controller design is based on a finite state au- 
tomaton. We introduce a new type PHASES to  rep- 
resent the phases of the automaton. 
[PHASES] 
The control automaton consists of three different 
phases. These are introduced as: 
Init, Idle, Act : PHASES 
A Idle # Act A Act # Init 
The Init phase describes the initial behaviour of the 
controller. In the Idle phase the automaton does noth- 
ing, and in the Act phase the automaton performs 
actions for avoiding possible collisions. The abbrevia- 
tions [Init], [Idle] and [Act] are in the following used 
to denote the current phase of the automaton. The 
phases of the automaton and the transitions between 
them are depicted in figure 2. @-U /----.- 
Figure 2: automaton 
We need two new constants: E and 6. The param- 
eter E is used to specify a latency time for the system 
to react and move from one phase to another. The 
parameter 6 is used for a latency time for the system 
to enable the alert mechanism. 
~ , 6  : Time 
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We decide that the automaton starts in the Init phase, 
and that the Init phase is followed by the Idle phase 
within time units. 
I N I T I A L S  ([ 1 -+ flnit]) A ([Init] 'Yt [Idle]) 
The next schema states that  the Idle phase is followed 
by the Act phase. 
T R A N S  & [Idle] + [Act] 
The predicate Danger, defined as 
Danger 2 Close[2R/x?] 
determines when a transition is allowed to be per- 
formed. The predicate states simply if there is risk 
for a collision. The enabled transitions are specified 
in the schema E N A  B- T R A  N S .  
ENAB-TRANS 
[Idle] A Danger 4 [Act] 
[Act] A -Danger -% [Idle] 
The next schema, CON-STABILITY , describe the 
conditions needed to maintain a phase. 
CO N-S T A  B IL I T  Y r AIRSPACE 
[Idle] A TDanger + [Idle] 
[Act] A Danger + rAct1 
The actuator part of the system, i.e. the alert mech- 
anism, is activated in the Act phase. This decision is 
specified as: 
[Act] 4 [InDanger C Alert1 
The total specification of the controller design is given 
by a collection of schemas: 
DES1 INITIAL  A T R A N S  A 
ENAB-TRANS A ACTIONS A 
CO N-S T A  B IL I T  Y 
As a final specification we introduce a schema for the 
control design of the CAS subsystem: 
C A S i A D E S l  A ASMI 
The proof obligation is then to show the correctness 
of the control design, i.e. 
CAS1 j REQ 
which is verified in Appendix A. 
5 Conclusion 
We have illustrated an  application of a Timed-Z 
notation comprising of an embedding of the Duration 
Calculus into the Z specification language. The ad- 
vantages of this is twofold: besides specifying and rea- 
soning about timing properties of real-time systems, it 
provides also composite modular specifications. The 
latter is a necessity when dealing with complex sys- 
tems. The example of the specification of a subsystem 
of the Air Traffic Monitoring System illustrates this 
thesis. The other subsystems have been specified in a 
similar manner as done here [6]. 
Another advantage of the presented approach is 
the possibility for application of the existing software 
tools. The presented specification and verification has 
been checked by the DC/PC tool. This has resulted 
in detection of some missing details. For instance the 
stability of the measured positions was not captured 
in the initial specification, but the proof assistant in- 
sisted on the necessity of this fact. Thus for large 
scale development of real-time systems the assistance 
of tools for type checking and mechanical verification 
is indispensable. This will not reduce design time, but 
it will certainly liberate the designer from the tedious 
parts of the verification, and ensure the correctness of 
the design. 
Acknowledgements 
I am very grateful to Anders P.  Ravn for his in- 
spiring and indeed very valuable comments and ideas 
on this case study. Thanks to Kirsten M. Hansen and 
Jens U. Skakkebaek for their helpful comments and 
suggestions. 
References 
D. Bjdrner. A ProCoS Project Description. ES- 
PRIT BRA 3104, EATCS Bull. no. 39, Oct. 1989. 
S.M. Brien, M. Engel, He Jifeng, H. Rischel, and 
A.P. Ravn. Z Description of Duration Calculus. 
Technical report, Draft. OU HJF 12/2 
J. Bowen, M. F'ranzle, E.R. Riidiger, and A.P. 
Ravn. Developing Correct Systems. Proc. 5th Eu- 
romicro Workshop on Real- Time Systems, pages 
176-187, June 1993. 
M. Engel. Specifying Real-Time Systems with Z 
and the Duration Calculus. To appear in ZZJW'94 
K.M. Hansen, H.Rische1, and A.P. Ravn. Spec- 
ifying and Verifying Requirements of Real-Time 
Systems. IEEE Transactions on Software Engi- 
neering, Vol 19(1):41-55, 1993. 
R. Inal. Specifying and Verifying Real-Time Sys- 
tems. Master's thesis, ID/DTH/RI, 1993. 
K. Jackson. Aircraft Traffic Control. Technical 
report, University of Stirling, 1992. 
Authorized licensed use limited to: Danmarks Tekniske Informationscenter. Downloaded on July 08,2010 at 11:23:08 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
[8] S .  .Owre, N. Shankar, and J.M. Rushby. User 
Guzde for the P VS Specification and Verification 
System, Language and Proof Checker. Technical 
report, CSL, SRI Intl., October 1993. 
[9] J.U. Skakkebaek, H. Rischel, A.P. Ravn, and Z. 
Chaochen. Specification of Embedded Real-Time 
Systems. Proc. 4th Euromicro Workshop on Real- 
Time Systems, pages 116-121, June 1992. 
[lo] J.U. Skakkebaek, and N. Shankar. Towards a Du- 
ration Calculus Proof Assistant in PVS. Techni- 
cal Report ID/DTH/JUS 5/1, Lyngby, Denmark 
March 1994. Paper version submitted for publica- 
tion. 
[ll] J.M. Spivey. The 2 Notation: A Reference Man- 
ual. Prentice-Hall, 2nd edition, 1992. 
A Appendix A 
diction. Assume 
Our single safety requirement is proved by contra- 
i R E Q  ~ ( C l ( l C 0 1 l ) )  e0 C 0 l l  
The formula, OColl, is split into three cases: 
Case a : Coll ; true 
Case b : Allsafe ; Coll 
Case c : A11Safe ; Danger ; Col1 
which corresponds to occurrence of a collision, respec- 
tively, at the beginning of the observation interval, 
immediately after a situation, where all aircraft are 
safely separated, and immediately after a situation, 
where a collision risk is observed. 
Case b can not occur, because our design does not, 
by Fact2 and ASMI, allow such big changes of posi- 
tions. We examine now the first case. INITIAL de- 
composes to [ ] or [ ln i t l  ; true. It is easy to see that 
[ 1 A Coll ; true + false. The rest of the analysis of 
the first case gives: 
Col1 ; true A [Init] ; true 
3 {INITIAL} 
Coll ; true A (e 5 Tinit A [Init] V 
+ {PLogic, ASMI} 
Col1 ; true A AllSafe V 
Coll ; true A Allsafe ; [Idle] ; true 
O(Col1 A AllSafe) 
Ofalse 
false 
e = Tinit ; [Idle] ; true) 
3 CDC} 
{ R  > r }  
* { D e }  
Before starting on the analysis of Case c we state a 
lemma: 
Lemmal: If the automaton is in the Idle phase while 
there is danger for collision then the danger will be 
avoided within E + S + Tal time units. 
Proof 
[Idle] ; true A Danger 
j { ENA B- T R A  N S }  
e 5 E A [Idle] A Danger V 
L = E ; ([Act] ; true A Danger) 
1 = E ; ([Act] ; true A Danger) 
1 = E + 6 ; ( Act1 ; true A Danger A 
[InDanger A l e r t ] )  
j { A S M I ,  CON-STABILITY,  e 2 E + 6 + Tal}  
1 = E + 6 + Tal ; ([Act1 ; true A [InDanger = 01) 
j {Definitions} 
e = E + 6 + Tal ; Allsafe 
* {e 2 E }  
+- {ACTIONS,  e 2 E + 61 
Case is split into three more cases, each depending 
on the current phase of the automaton. We will go 
through the case, where the current phase is Idle: 
[Idle] ; true A (Allsafe ; Danger ; Coli) 
3 { CON-STABILITY}  
AllSafe ; ([Idle] ; true A Danger ; Coli) 
+ { Lemmal}  
Allsafe ; (e 5 E + 6 + Tal V 
=+ CDC} 
Allsafe ; 15 E + 6 + Tal ; Coll V 
Allsafe ; L = E + 6 + Tal ; Allsafe ; Coll 
3 {Fac t l ,  e > R-r - T 2 E + S  + Tal} 
false V A l l S a f ~ ~ ? o l l  
+ {Case b ,  PLogic} 
false 
1 = E + 6 + Tal ; Allsafe)  ; Coll) 
The implication in the last case has been derived under 
the assumption 
Hence the final general design decision is: 
R - r > ( T + T a i + S + E ) . v , , ,  
This completes the verification of the correctness of 
the control design. 
B Appendix B 
Factl: A potential collision is detectable if all air- 
craft are safe before a collision and if T < Tcoll. 
O(Al1Safe ; true ; Coll 3 e 2 Tcoll - T )  
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Proof: 
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